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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Daniel Holmes, a disbarred attorney and 
accountant, appeals from the sentence imposed by the 
District Court following his plea of guilty to two 
indictments. One indictment charged Holmes with 
conspiracy; bank, wire, and mail fraud; interstate 
transportation of stolen property; income tax fraud; and 
forgery. The other charged him with forgery of two federal 
judges' signatures. The District Court sentenced Holmes to 
96 months in prison, ordered him to pay restitution in the 
amount of $1,899,838.80, and imposed a special 
assessment of $8,650.00. 
 
Holmes appeals his sentence, challenging the District 
Court's upward departure from the sentencing guidelines 
by two levels for extraordinary abuse of a position of trust, 
the court's imposition of restitution without formally 
determining his ability to pay, and the court's calculation of 




We review the underlying facts briefly as they give some 
indication of the nature and extent of the schemes Holmes 
devised between 1994 and 1996 to defraud his clients and 
acquaintances. 
 
In October of 1994, one of Holmes' clients was involved 
in a protracted business dispute. In anticipation of 
litigation, Holmes asked his client to deposit money in an 
escrow account under Holmes' name while the matter was 
being resolved. Holmes then prepared a fabricated 
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settlement agreement for a non-existent lawsuit and forged 
the opposing party's signature. In connection with this 
scheme, Holmes produced what he represented to be court 
orders to which he forged the signatures first of United 
States District Judge James Giles and later of United States 
District Judge Norma L. Shapiro. Thereafter, Holmes 
withdrew money from the escrow account that his client 
had funded and forwarded that money to his client as the 
purported settlement. To distract the client's requests for 
the additional funds he was to receive under the 
"settlement," Holmes invented more lies. 
 
Also in October of 1994, Holmes, presented with several 
bonds belonging to the aunt and uncle of his neighbor, 
forged the signature of his neighbor's dying uncle without 
the neighbor's knowledge, had a friend notarize the 
signature, redeemed the bonds, and deposited the money, 
totaling over $150,000, in his own account. 
 
In January of 1995, Holmes created a fraudulent low- 
income housing investment venture and fabricated 
documents that attested to the viability and soundness of 
the prospect. Eleven investors made checks payable to an 
account held by Holmes. After making one quarterly 
payment to his investors, Holmes admitted that he had 
spent all of the investors' money. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Holmes defrauded a client who had 
come to him with a tax problem by eliciting money from the 
client for a contrived settlement with the federal 
government. Holmes then used the "settlement" money for 
his own gain. He elicited additional money from the same 
client for a non-existent state tax liability, and then again 
for an investment scheme. 
 
In another scheme in 1995, Holmes persuaded two 
clients who were finally in a position to satisfy their 
outstanding federal tax obligations to write checks which he 
undertook to use to pay off taxes owed but which he 
instead placed straight into his bank account. Although he 
eventually returned the money, he failed to satisfy his 
clients' outstanding tax obligations as promised. In yet 
another tax scheme, Holmes took advantage of two clients 
for whom he had been filing business tax returns for years 
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by selling them fictitious tax credits and claiming non- 
existent low-income housing tax credits on their tax 
returns. 
 
Further, in early 1996 Holmes, acting in conspiracy with 
two of the three cousins of a man who died intestate, 
prepared a false will naming one of the cousins as the 
executor and naming the two cousins as the sole 
beneficiaries of the estate. Holmes forged the signature of 
the deceased testator and, acting with the two cousins, 
established an estate account from which all three drew for 
their personal benefit. 
 
In addition, Holmes engaged in money laundering. 
Between February and June of 1996, he withdrew money 
from the account established in the fake will scheme and 
purchased cashier's checks from Mellon Bank in an 
attempt to conceal the origin of the money. Thereafter, he 
used the cashier checks to pay off victims of his other 
schemes and to make purchases for his general benefit. 
 
Eventually, all of the above-mentioned schemes were 
discovered and Holmes was charged in two indictments. 
Holmes pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in 
exchange for the dismissal of 114 counts from one 
indictment. His sentence was calculated under the 
Sentencing Guidelines. He was sentenced for fraud 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, which has a base offense 
level of 6, to which there were enhancements of twelve 
levels for the amount of loss, U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1 (b)(1)(M); two 
levels for more than minimal planning, U.S.S.G.S 2F1.1 
(b)(2)(A); two levels for vulnerable victim, U.S.S.G. S 3A1.1; 
four levels for aggravating role, U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1(a); and two 
levels for abuse of a position of trust or use of a special 
skill, U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3. At the request of the government, 
the District Court departed upwards two additional levels 
pursuant to S 5K2.0 based on Holmes' extraordinary abuse 
of a position of trust because the court believed the two- 
level enhancement for abuse of a position of trust was 
insufficient. 
 






Holmes asserts that the District Court erred in granting 
an upward departure for extraordinary abuse of trust. He 
argues that there was nothing extraordinary about his 
situation that warranted the upward departure, and 
contends that the other level enhancements included in his 
sentence accounted for any egregious actions on his part so 
that the two-level upward departure was in effect double 
counting. 
 
In determining the appropriateness of an upward 
departure, we must first determine "whether a factor is a 
permissible basis for departure under any circumstances," 
or, in other words, we must decide as a matter of law if 
departure was warranted. Koon v. United States , 518 U.S. 
81, 100 (1996). This phase of the review is plenary. United 
States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1098 (3d Cir. 1990). If 
it is established that an upward departure is appropriate, 
we must then determine whether the degree of the 
departure was reasonable. Id. 
 
Under U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0, a district court may either 
increase or decrease the offense level if it believes that the 
level contemplated by the sentencing guideline does not 
accurately reflect the nature of the case. U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0; 
United States v. Corrigan, 128 F.3d 330, 333 (6th Cir. 
1997). Grounds for departure include the finding of an 
aggravating circumstance not contemplated by the 
Commission or, if contemplated, the presence of a factor 
that far exceeds the expectation of the commissioners. 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0; United States v. Ventura, 146 F.3d 91, 97 
(2d Cir. 1998). Also, if a factor is not normally part of the 
equation in sentencing outside the guideline range, but is 
present in an unusual degree and distinguishes a case from 
the heartland of cases covered by the guidelines, departure 
is appropriate. U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0. Finally, the commentary to 
S 5K2.0 suggests that a court may be presented with a case 
where none of the characteristics or circumstances 
individually distinguish the case from the heartland cases, 
yet the court may find that a combination of the 
characteristics and circumstances make it extraordinary. 
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Holmes argues that his activities in this case were 
precisely of the kind envisioned by the sentencing 
guidelines, and therefore could not be the subject of a 
departure. The guideline for abuse of a position of trust, 
S 3B1.3, provides that "[i]f the defendant abused a position 
of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a 
manner that significantly facilitated the commission or 
concealment of the offense," the court should increase the 
sentence by two levels. Holmes refers to our opinion in 
United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 548 (3d Cir. 1994), 
where we held that a scheme involving thirty-one victims 
and millions of dollars of stolen money was not outside the 
heartland of fraud cases. Id. at 548. Copple is not 
analogous to the situation here because the defendant 
there was not charged with abuse. Rather, the District 
Court in Copple upwardly departed based on the number of 
victims and the amount of monetary loss involved. Id. at 
547. 
 
Holmes also refers to United States v. Bennett , 161 F.3d 
171 (3d Cir. 1998), where the district court imposed a two- 
level enhancement for abuse of trust but did not upwardly 
depart for the same offense even though the scheme in that 
case was extensive. In Bennett, however, the prosecution 
did not ask for an upward departure, so the court had no 
opportunity to review whether the abuse of trust in that 
case fell outside the heartland. See id. at 195-96. 
 
The District Court in this case explained its reasons for 
the upward departure as follows: 
 
       I am of the view that the two point enhancement for 
       abuse of position of trust under 3B1.3 is inadequate to 
       reflect the widespread fraud and criminal activity in 
       this case. The act of signing a judge's signature, the act 
       of preparing a will and forging it after a decedent has 
       died and all of the other various acts of a violation of 
       trust to the various victims, some as attorney, some as 
       accountant, I find are extraordinary. 
 
App. at 72. The court later added: 
 
       A case like this, you don't really grasp the case 
       because it's just figures and documents, but if you 
       read the victim impact statements, it comes alive and 
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       there are people who will be suffering from this for the 
       rest of their lives because it has affected their 
       retirement income in some cases, it has affected their 
       expectations in others. 
 
App. at 87. 
 
Holmes perpetuated various and distinct schemes, all 
involving abuse of positions of trust. He prepared legal 
documents out of whole cloth, and then forged the 
signature of two federal judges. He defrauded clients, next 
door neighbors, and investors. His activities were 
successful in eight separate schemes because of the 
positions of trust he held. We see nothing in the 
background and commentary sections that accompany the 
abuse-of-trust guideline that suggests the Sentencing 
Commission envisioned multiple acts of abuse of trust to 
the degree that was present in this case. Cf. Ventura, 146 
F.3d at 97 ("[T]he language of the guideline and 
commentary suggest that the rule was drafted without 
consideration that the defendant might engage in multiple 
episodes of obstructive conduct."). Accordingly, we agree 
with the District Court that the type and extent of Holmes' 
activities are beyond our experience and are not of the kind 
envisioned by the guideline for abuse of a position of trust. 
 
Holmes next contends that the departure is not justified 
because the factors not sufficiently accounted for under the 
abuse-of-trust provision are accounted for elsewhere in the 
adjustments that were made. First, he argues that the 
twelve-level enhancement he received for the amount of loss 
under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1)(M) considers the same factors 
on which the District Court based its decision to upwardly 
depart. He points us to the District Court's statement that 
the motion for upward departure was granted because"the 
two-point enhancement for abuse of a position of trust 
under 3B1.3 is inadequate to reflect the widespread fraud 
and criminal activity in this case." Contrary to Holmes' 
assertion, however, the District Court's statement focuses 
on the impact and suffering caused by Holmes' deceptions 
and the breadth and manner in which Holmes carried out 
his endeavors while in a position of trust, rather than on 
the number of people affected or the amount of economic 
loss incurred. 
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Nor does the two-level enhancement Holmes received for 
"more than minimal planning," U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(2)(A), 
account for his extraordinary abuse of trust. We have 
stated that "[w]hether a defendant's crime involved `more 
than minimal planning' considers the deliberative aspects 
of a defendant's conduct and criminal scheme, and does 
not necessarily include consideration of the defendant's 
position of trust, if any." United States v. Georgiadis, 933 
F.2d 1219, 1226 (3d Cir. 1991). If, as Georgiadis clearly 
indicates, adjustments for more than minimal planning and 
abuse of a position of trust do not amount to double 
counting, it follows that a departure based on extraordinary 
abuse of trust does not doubly count factors considered in 
an adjustment for more than minimal planning. Similarly, 
Holmes' increase under U.S.S.G. S 3A1.1 for a vulnerable 
victim does not speak to the manner and extent to which 
he defrauded those victims, and the four-level increase 
Holmes received for an "aggravating role" under U.S.S.G. 
S 3B1.1(a) reflects his leadership role in his extensive 
criminal activities rather than the egregious manner in 
which he abused his position of trust. 
 
Finally, the government did not move for departure solely 
on the fact that Holmes possessed a special skill as an 
attorney, as Holmes suggests. Instead, the government 
merely emphasized the fact that Holmes was in a position 
of trust because he had the special skills that made others 
confident in his abilities. U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3 (abuse of trust) 
does not prohibit an enhancement under S 3B1.1 
(aggravating role) if both prongs of U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3 are 
violated. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court's 
decision to upwardly depart for extraordinary abuse of trust 
was not made on a legally impermissible basis. 
 
Having reached that conclusion, it requires considerably 
less discussion to affirm the reasonableness of the degree of 
departure. In Koon, the Supreme Court advised that on this 
issue we must allow the district courts considerable 
discretion to determine the degree to which a departure is 
warranted. 518 U.S. at 100. The departure of an additional 
two levels for abuse of a position of trust under the 
circumstances of this case was reasonable. We therefore 
hold that the two-level upward departure was within the 
District Court's discretion. 
 




Holmes challenges the Order requiring him to pay 
restitution in the amount of $1,899,784.80 for all the 
offenses he committed between 1994 and 1996. Our review 
of this legal issue is plenary. Holmes contends that under 
the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. 
S 3664, the statute applicable to all offenses occurring prior 
to April 24, 1996, the district courts were required to make 
a determination of the defendant's ability to pay before 
imposing restitution. In this case, all but one of Holmes' 
schemes took place prior to April 24, 1996. The government 
agrees with the need for a remand. It reads the District 
Court's order as properly ordering $1,320,872.59 in 
restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act 
(MVRA) for the fake will scheme, but concedes that the 
court ordered restitution in the amount of $578,912.30 
under the VWPA. 
 
According to the VWPA, the court must "consider the 
financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs 
and earning ability of the defendant . . . and other such 
factors the court deems appropriate." 18 U.S.C.S 3663(a). 
We have asked the district courts to " `make specific 
findings as to the factual issues that are relevant to the 
application of the restitution provisions of the VWPA.' " 
United States v. Logar, 975 F.2d 958, 961 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(quoting United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 480 (3d Cir. 
1985)). Because the District Court did not undertake the 
factual inquiry that is required of it before determining the 
amount of restitution Holmes should pay for all the 
offenses falling under the purview of the VWPA, we are 
obliged to vacate the restitution order and remand the case 
so that the necessary factual findings may be made 




Holmes also argues that the District Court erred in 
imposing the special assessment of $8,650. Holmes failed 
to object to the special assessment and thus we review for 
plain error. 
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As Holmes notes correctly, the special assessment was 
based on 165 counts from the two indictments. However, 
on July 31, 1998, the District Court dismissed 114 of the 
165 counts pursuant to the government's request. 
Therefore, the assessment should have been based on 51 
counts, the number of counts left after the dismissal. 
Holmes argues the correct total should be $2,950, which he 
computes as $50 per count for the 43 counts on offenses 
occurring prior to April 24, 1996, and $100 per count for 
the 8 counts on offenses occurring after April 24, 1996. The 
government agrees that we must remand for this purpose. 
On remand, the District Court will have the opportunity to 




For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction and the portion of the sentence that sets the 
term of imprisonment. We will vacate so much of the 
sentence as imposes the order of restitution and the special 
assessment and remand for further proceedings. 
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